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Background 
 
For four years through to mid 2007 the ‘global economy 
boomed’ (International Monetary Fund, October 2008), with 
world growth averaging some 5% per annum, the strongest 
sustained rate for some three decades. Growth in 
developing and emerging economies was pronounced with 
China, India and Brazil reporting amongst the strongest 
annual growth rates. At the same time inflation remained 
modest and an image of macroeconomic stability prevailed 
in both political and financial circles. In the UK policies of 
targeting inflation levels have been evident since 1997 and 
a policy of low and stable inflation was evident in the US 
where Alan Greenspan led the US Federal Reserve. 
 
The general picture was one of relatively strong economic 
growth; low and stable inflation, matched by low interest 
rates. Unemployment was falling; investment was rising as 
were incomes and profits while home ownership was 
increasing. Fiscal rules were established in the UK so that 
borrowing would be prudent and only for investment (see 
the Golden Rule and the Sustainable Investment Rule). 
Soon global financial innovation led to strong growth in that 
sector (at the sector’s peak it represented 25 per cent of all 
firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index whereas at the 
time of writing it is in the low teens) but across the 
developed world the authorities favoured light touch 
regulation. 
 
In these apparently benign conditions countries 
experienced economic prosperity and were able to pursue 
a range of social and domestic agendas. House prices, 
financial stocks and assets, commodity prices, tax 
revenues, profits, wages etc. all grew at a reasonable rate. 
 
Despite some mild warnings on rising oil prices, the 
increasing need for financial regulation, rising global 
financial imbalances, the concerns as to the durability of 
low interest rates in the long term, as well as rapidly rising 
house and stock prices; governments, investors and 
consumers continued to take comfort on the perceptions of 
macroeconomic stability, continued global low real interest 
rates and sustainable growth.  
 
In these global conditions household and corporate 
borrowing rose rapidly from 1998 onwards in the United 
Kingdom. As the Bank of England noted ‘over time, banks 
took on progressively more credit risk by lending to, for 
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example, households with high loan to income ratios, 
leveraged buy out firms and, in the United States, to the 
sub prime market’ (Bank of England, Financial Stability 
Report. October 2008).  
 
Additionally, more complex financial products using 
leverage to improve returns emerged in the climate of 
rising financial liquidity, and as the Bank of England noted, 
in a context of ‘lower discrimination between instruments of 
differing financial quality’ (Bank of England, Financial 
Stability Report. October 2008). The internationalisation of 
finance and rising current account surpluses in oil 
producing and some Asian countries enabled UK banks to 
dramatically expand their lending. In 2001 UK customer 
lending was comparable to customer deposits, but 2008 
the surplus of lending over deposits was £700 billion, and 
real leveraged buyout loan issuance rose from  under $100 
billion in 2004 to over $500 billion in 2007 (Bank of England 
Stability Report October 2008). 
 
The vulnerabilities of these developments became 
increasingly evident as oil prices rose rapidly (peaking at 
$147 in June 2008) driving up energy and food prices and 
increasing numbers defaulted on sub prime mortgages. As 
these concerns and the underlying structural problems in 
the international financial system became apparent there 
was a sharp increase in financial instability and the ‘credit 
crunch’, ‘toxic assets’ and re-capitalising the financial 
sector emerged as a popular terms.  
 
 
Scottish Forecasts – some scenarios 
 
 
Introduction 
The last time the FAI forecast was conducted on a scenario 
basis was in March 2003 to explore the possible outcome 
and impacts of the war in Iraq on the UK and Scotland. 
Due to the gravity of the current economic crisis it would be 
difficult to have a single point forecast due to the multiple 
competing factors that may influence the course of the 
world, UK and Scottish economies at this time. For these 
reasons the forecast has been conducted using four 
scenarios which have different underlying assumptions. 
The scenarios, with probabilities, are termed: 
 
 
 Optimistic scenario (15 per cent probability); 
 Central, our base scenario (40 per cent 
probability); 
 Recession plus slow recovery, a worse scenario 
(35 per cent probability) and  
 Sustained recession, a really poor scenario (10 
per cent probability). 
 
 
Each scenario is described in the text while the 
assumptions are fully documented in Appendix 1. The 
focus remains on GVA growth, employment and net job 
changes as well as unemployment.  
 
Assumptions for final demand 
The central case was used to define the most likely factors 
to be of importance going forward at this time. Thereafter 
for each scenario the different outcomes were considered 
and an interpretation given as to how that would fit with a 
particular scenario. The critical issues were deemed to be: 
 
 Interest rates and monetary policy; 
 Inflationary expectations; 
 Re-capitalisation of banks and financial 
institutions; 
 Lending behaviour; 
 The impact of the finance sector on the real 
economy; 
 The labour market; 
 House prices; 
 Government debt, imbalances and fiscal policy 
and  
 Exports. 
 
As usual the drivers of the FAI model are: 
 
 Consumption (C); 
 Government spending (G); 
 Investment (I); 
 Stocks (S); 
 Tourism (T) ; 
 Exports to the Rest of the UK (XRUK) and  
 Exports to the Rest of the World (XROW). 
 
In general terms our expectation is that consumption will 
contract in 2009 (-0.6 per cent) and only return to near 
trend by 2011-12. It is clear from UK data, from the 
relationship between Scottish and UK consumption and 
from retail sales data etc. that consumption in Scotland is 
falling.  
 
Government spending is vital in 2009 to help support the 
economy. Particularly relevant of course is the Government 
intervention in banks and Bank of England schemes to help 
support the economy (although this is factored into the 
assumptions government spending growth rates are taken 
as that identifiable expenditure seen in Scotland). The UK 
and Scottish governments, would in the normal course of 
events, act in a counter cyclical fashion, thus even as signs 
of recovery are appearing then government spending 
would start to decline. This is a significant change in the 
scenarios because compared to the Central scenario there 
are times when government spending does not decline 
depending on the assumed economic conditions of the 
scenario and on timing.  
 
Investment is the driver that is hit hardest by the current 
economic climate as most businesses have completely 
abandoned investment plans faced with spiralling costs 
and the difficulties of securing borrowing at affordable 
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rates. Investment is expected to shrink by 6 per cent in 
2009 and by a further 0.4 per cent in 2010. By 2012 it is 
only assumed to grow by 2.4 per cent in the Central 
scenario. 
 
Stocks and tourism are relatively muted with stocks 
building up just as the turning point of the crisis emerged 
and tourism has been very poor since 2005 and estimates 
indicate it may be 2011 before any significant growth is 
seen. 
 
Exports comprise of two components (XRUK and XROW). 
XRUK are expected to be poor in 2008 and 2009 but to 
pick up slightly in 2010. Export performance to the Euro 
Area and the US is expected to be at its lowest in 2009 
(looking forward only) and to grow by 7.1 per cent in 2011. 
Even the sterling depreciation which should boost exports 
is more than offset by the decline in demand in the US, the 
Euro Area and other export markets. 
 
Clearly all the evidence points to 2009 being a very poor 
year and the expectation is that economic growth will be 
low; trading conditions will be difficult and the labour 
market is definitely weakening. Co-ordinated fiscal and 
monetary policy will be crucial issues across the globe. At 
the beginning of each scenario there will be a brief 
explanation about how the drivers of final demand differ 
from the Central scenario. The Central scenario will be 
outlined in detail first. 
 
 
Four scenarios of possible outcomes 
 
The Central scenario in detail 
The main scenario is one where interest rates are cut to 
about 3 per cent in 2009 (this scenario was started before 
the Bank of England cut rates by 150 basis points!) and 
inflation is relatively muted. 2009 is the year where most of 
the pain takes place with a sharp contraction in the finance 
and service sector affecting the rest of the economy. 
Lending eases after some12 months and the 
recapitalisation plan works well although companies 
(especially small and medium sized firms) find rescheduling 
debt etc. difficult. The Government’s debt rises quickly but 
compared to other developed nations the debt to GDP ratio 
remains favourable. House prices contract sharply and 
continue falling and there is a period of 3-5 years where 
prices are stagnant. The labour market weakens and 
exports fall. 
 
GVA and broad sectoral output 
GVA growth is forecast to be 0.7 per cent in 2008 and -1.1 
per cent in 2009. Growth in 2011 rises to 1.2 per cent and 
to 1.5 per cent in 2012. This is presented in Figure 1 and is 
compared to GVA growth in the other scenarios. This 
scenario is estimated to be the most probable outcome for 
the Scottish economy with a 40 per cent probability. 
Monetary policy, inflationary pressures and the government 
recovery plan push the probable outcome to between this 
scenario and the optimistic scenario. However, the fall in 
house prices, lending behaviour and labour market 
weakness pull the probable outcome down toward the 
recession scenario.  
 
Figure 1 presents the probable path of the growth of GVA 
under the four scenarios and the Central scenario growth is 
for a relatively quick return to positive growth following this 
global shock. There have only been four years since 1964 
when GDP growth was negative: 1974 (-0.04 per cent); 
1975 (-1.47 per cent); 1980 (-1.93 per cent) and 1981 (-
1.38 per cent) and in the years 1986 and 1991 GDP was 
less than 0.5 per cent. Otherwise the Scottish economy 
has enjoyed 40 years of economic growth which was 
strongest in 1964 at 7.57 per cent (Scottish Government 
GVA Index, 2004 prices). 
 
The service sector usually drives growth in the Scottish 
economy but due to the nature of the downturn the service 
sector is likely to bear the brunt of the recession along with 
construction. Manufacturing and agriculture, while still 
affected although by a lesser degree. Services are forecast 
to contract by 1.3 per cent after growth of 1.3 per cent in 
2008. It is likely to be 2012 before growth of 1.6 per cent is 
seen again. It may be 2015 before growth of 2 per cent is 
experienced. 
 
Manufacturing has had a difficult time over 2005-06 and in 
2008. The sector is forecast to contract by 0.1 per cent in 
2009 but to grow again by 0.5 per cent in 2010. Growth is 
forecast to be 1 per cent by 2012. Manufacturing is actually 
quite strong and resilient despite very difficult trading and 
lending conditions as firms have become accustomed to 
this. The sector has been shedding jobs continuously since 
1998 but productivity remains good as the sector has had 
positive growth in 7 of the last 11 years. The main problem 
(ignoring cash-flow) for growth in this sector is the collapse 
of investment. Investment in plant & machinery, new 
technology, training, and productivity is key to the health of 
the sector. As yet it is unclear how the sector is faring but 
business survey evidence indicates that manufacturing is in 
for a difficult time and actual growth may be lower than the 
forecasts presented here. 
 
Construction grew at a very strong pace in the period 2003-
06 but has declined by 2 per cent in 2007 and is forecast to 
contract by 2.1 per cent in 2008. Growth could shrink by a 
further 2.4 per cent in 2009 and the sector is not forecast to 
recover to stronger growth until 2012 although modest 
positive growth is forecast for 2010 
 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing is forecast to grow by 0.3 
per cent in 2008 but to decline marginally in 2009. The 
sector is forecast to recover gradually through 2010 to 
2012. Figure 2 presents growth for 2008-12 for the main 
sectors of the Scottish economy.
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Figure 1:  Comparison of GVA growth under the four scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
Note: The Central scenario shows two thin lines either side of it outlining the probable spread of forecasts. As time increases this dispersion 
becomes wider. This scenario is plotted in its mid range. 
The optimistic scenario is plotted at the bottom of its range and the error bar shows the probable upward range (no line shown as this is quite 
small). 
The sustained recession scenario is plotted at the top of its range and all the risks are to the downside with this scenario. It is shown with a 
probable boundary of outcomes by the slightly darker thin line at the very bottom of the chart. This demonstrates that GVA growth could contract 
at best by 1.56 per cent or at its worst by 2.06 per cent in 2009. 
The recession case scenario has no probable outcome shown for the sake of clarity as it is similar to the central scenario probability. 
 
 
The Optimistic scenario 
The next scenario considers a more optimistic outlook for 
the economy. Essentially most factors here are optimal e.g. 
policy, timing, lending behaviour, recapitalisation and in this 
scenario expectations are exceeded slightly. This scenario 
has the current Bank of England’s monetary response with 
a deeper and earlier than expected cut in interest rates. It 
may be that a further 50 basis point cut, say in February, 
would firmly push this scenario more into the middle 
ground. The downside factors to this scenario are the 
apparent reluctance of financial institutions to deal more 
sympathetically with borrowers with difficulties; the 
weakening labour market especially the sharp shedding of 
labour and the problems in the housing market. This 
scenario has one additional assumption and that is that the 
homecoming is particularly successful and tourism, retail, 
transport etc. all benefit from this. The other scenarios 
assume that 2009 is a credit crunch year in external 
economies as well, and despite the weak pound travellers 
do not respond as anticipated due to falling disposable 
income and that they face rising costs. 
 
GVA growth in this scenario is forecast to be -1 per cent in 
2009 and 1 per cent in 2010. The economy recovers to 1.6 
per cent in 2010 and 1.8 per cent in 2012. This is a quick 
but not a painless transition from the recession of 2009. 
Nevertheless, all the main sectors still contract in 2009 
under these assumptions. 
 
Services shrink by 1.2 per cent in 2009 but grow by 1 per 
cent in 2010. By 2012 growth in the service sector is close 
to 2 per cent. Manufacturing performs well with a small 
decline in 2009 but relatively strong growth in 2010 through 
to 2012. Investment is expected to pick up in 2011 by 2 per 
cent and export performance is also estimated to be 
relatively strong from 2010 onwards. While construction is 
forecast to decline by 2.4 per cent in 2009, it recovers well
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Figure 2:  Comparison of GVA and sectoral growth:  Central scenario, 2008-2012 
 
 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
Recession plus slow recovery, a scenario 
where economic conditions are worse than 
expected  
This scenario envisages a situation where the Bank of 
England takes a more cautious and stepwise approach to 
interest rate cutting while inflationary pressures begin to 
build due to fundamentals of oil supply and demand and 
OPEC action. While recapitalisation works there are some 
initial problems but crucially lending behaviour does not 
ease for some time, perhaps 12-18 months. The 
expectation is that the Bank of England base rate and the 
interbank lending rate do not converge quickly. These 
factors mean that the impact of the crisis across the real 
economy is more acute and particularly small and medium-
sized businesses suffer. House prices remain flat for about 
5 years as labour market support weakens considerably 
and unemployment increases more quickly than expected. 
Exporting firms also face considerable hardship under this 
scenario. 
 
Growth of GVA in this case is -1.2 per cent for 2009 and 
recovery is slow with 0.6 per cent in 2010 and just over 1 
per cent in 2012. The service sector declines by 1.4 per 
cent in 2009 and only grows by 0.6 per cent in 2010. By 
2012 growth in services is 1.9 per cent. Manufacturing 
contracts slightly in 2009, has some small positive growth 
in 2010 but declines again in 2011 and in 2012. This is in 
part due to very tough trading conditions, slow investment 
but primarily because firms find it difficult or expensive to 
secure funding and capital. Companies in the export 
market are also more exposed and more likely to contract 
than grow. This is seen across the forecast horizon. Figure 
3 depicts the forecast for the main sectors in this scenario. 
The plight of manufacturing can clearly be seen as is the 
obvious reverse in construction. Construction performs 
poorly in 2011 as this scenario does not have adequate 
lending, poor labour market opportunities and falling 
incomes so consumers are not yet ready to step onto the 
housing market in significant numbers. Furthermore there 
are significant bottlenecks as public investment projects go 
ahead (these will have had long lead times) and the 
situation is not resolved until late 2011 or 2012. Figure 3 
also demonstrates the recovery of the service sector and 
how GVA follows it closely. The last scenario is the 
sustained recession outcome. 
 
 
The Sustained recession scenario, the worst 
case scenario for the economy 
The previous scenarios were relatively similar but did have 
different assumptions and these led to slightly different 
growth paths. The last scenario; the sustained recession 
outcome is not included to have something different but 
because all four scenarios are actual probable outcomes.  
This however, while having the smallest probability (10 per 
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Figure 3:  Comparison of GVA and sectoral growth: Recession scenario, 2008-2012 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
 
businesses and consumers wish to avoid. This will depend 
upon co-ordinated global monetary and fiscal policy 
appropriate to country circumstances as well as a domestic 
agenda that will deliver a recovery that does not simply 
exacerbate the current situation (as in Japan in the 1990s). 
 
This scenario is real in that further undisclosed losses in 
the banking system are declared at different times (in the 
US, UK and Europe). The recapitalisation plan and the 
scheme on offer from central banks does not cope or is not 
used appropriately by financial institutions. More capital is 
required for the world financial system. Lending behaviour 
is poor and private capital is either slow to respond or is not 
offered. Thus re-capitalisation takes about 24-36 months 
before the system is functioning properly again and private 
capital is attracted back to institutions. Fiscal packages do 
not give the response required either and banks are 
unresponsive to business needs. This causes significant 
hardship in the business community with several large 
firms in trouble leading to further falls in business and 
consumer confidence. Cash-flow becomes absolutely 
critical and job losses are probably severe. The housing 
market undergoes a prolonged contraction while other 
asset prices continue to fall. Uncertainty prevails as 
disposable income drops sharply and wealth shrinks. The 
government debt and imbalances grow although they 
remain favourable compared to other countries. It may 
even be that the situation causes the government to fall but 
replacing the government in this way may actually make 
the situation worse due to catch-up, experience etc. 
However fear and psychological factors become more 
important. Exports continue to fall but the weakening pound 
does set the scene for an export led recovery. The 
Monetary Policy Committee  faces a real dilemma as 
growth falters but inflationary pressure picks up 
significantly with oil prices rising to more than $100 per 
barrel due to supply and demand imbalances and OPEC 
action. In Scotland the finance sector may shed between 
20-30,000 jobs alone. 
 
In this scenario growth is forecast to be -1.6 per cent in 
2009 and is also negative in 2010 (-0.4 per cent). Even by 
2012 growth has not recovered to more than 1 per cent. 
Manufacturing is forecast to stall in 2009 and contracts 
every year thereafter up to 2012 due to the severe 
economic conditions. Construction is also negative for the 
period 2008-11 with growth of 0.9 in 2012. 
 
The service sector decline in both 2009 and 2010 and 
forecast growth is only modest in 2011. The finance
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Figure 4:  Comparison of GVA and sectoral growth: Sustained recession scenario, 2008-2012 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
 
  
sector contracts sharply in 2008 and 2009. There is no 
return to strong growth in the forecast period under this 
scenario. The most important point, if this set of 
circumstances emerged, is that the economy can only 
recover slowly and it may take 4-6 years before steady 
growth is seen again. 
This outcome highlights the vital importance of getting 
policy right and that consumers, businesses, financial 
institutions as well as government must act responsibly if 
the economy is to avoid a situation like this. Fortunately the 
probability of such an outcome is very low at 10 per cent 
but it still remains a very real possibility and has severe 
consequences for all concerned. There are several issues 
that come to light out of this: 
 
 Tax cuts – these should be designed so that real 
benefits can be realised from cutting taxes. Simply 
hoarding the money or carrying on irresponsible 
spending by assuming this is a permanent change 
or increasing credit levels further will only bring 
more hardship in the future. Tax breaks for new 
jobs, retraining or other schemes that help the 
economy would be particularly useful as is the 
postponement of new taxes. Simplification of the 
tax system would also be welcome; 
 Monetary policy – it is crucial that the Bank of 
England (as they have done) remain in control of 
the situation rather than being dictated to by 
economic conditions. They need to get in front of 
the curve, inter-bank lending rates have to 
converge while long run interest rates need to 
stop systemic bubbles as low long-term interest 
rates encourage low fixed rates on mortgages 
fuelling housing bubbles; 
 Lending behaviour must respond to the needs of 
the real economy particularly the business sector. 
Failure to do this will simply drive more firms to 
insolvency (insolvencies have increased by 25 per 
cent in England & Wales). Rescheduling 
mortgage debt is also a priority especially if 
household income changes; 
 The linkages in the economy are relatively fragile 
and once the credit crunch affects one part it will 
transfer to other parts due to supplier linkages and 
sub-contracting etc. Trying to preserve skills, 
retain labour and maintain orders will be difficult 
under these conditions and 
 The labour market has been buoyant for several 
years with the Scottish employment rate 
outperforming the UK employment rate. The 
indications from economic data, surveys and the 
forecast demonstrate that jobs are not safe under 
considerable adverse economic pressure. Job 
losses are relatively widespread and can be 
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Figure 5:  Forecasts of net job change: scenario comparison, 2008-2012 
 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
 
 
particularly deep in the scenarios that are more 
problematic. 
 
 
Employment forecasts  
Each of the forecasts returned different employment 
outcomes. These are discussed here. The forecasts of net 
job changes under the four scenarios are presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 5.  
 
The net job loss for the Central scenario for 2008 was 
4,230 and 37,244 in 2009. Over 2007-12 15,300 jobs are 
lost in total. Clearly 2009 is the year of peak job loss. The 
strength of recovery in the years 2011 and 2012 also has 
marked differences. Over 2007-10 (when jobs are being 
shed in all scenarios) the job loss is 41,700 in the 
Optimistic case; 53,100 in the Central scenario; 66,400 in 
the Recession scenario and finally 110,000 in the final 
scenario. Similarly the only scenario which gives a positive 
net job change over the period 2007-12 is the Optimistic 
scenario where 11,900 jobs are created. 
 
In the Central scenario the service sector supplies 27,900 
jobs in 2011-12 compared to 40,400 in the Optimistic case 
and 23,500 in the Recession scenario while the Sustained 
recession scenario see 19,900 jobs created over 2011-12. 
Services gain 14,740 jobs over 2008-12 in the Optimistic 
scenario but lose 8,757 in the Central scenario; 22,422 in 
the Recession scenario and 71,089 in the Sustained 
recession scenario over the same period of time. Within 
services the forecast for the finance sector differs 
considerably according to the assumptions used. In both 
the Central scenario and the Optimistic case 10,000 jobs 
are lost whereas in the Recession scenario 14,900 jobs are 
shed and in the Sustained recession scenario 24,000 jobs 
are lost in 2009. 
 
Manufacturing loses 1,500 jobs in 2009 and a small 
amount in 2010 but adds 500 jobs in 20111 and 2012 in 
the Central scenario. In the Optimistic scenario 
manufacturing loses the same amount of jobs as in the 
Central case in 2009 but thereafter job gains are slight 
greater being close to 1,000 jobs per year in 2011 and 
2012. In the Recession scenario manufacturing sheds 
3,500 jobs in 2008; 1,600 jobs in 2009 and a further 1,500 
in 2011. In the last scenario this sector sheds a 
considerable amount jobs every year and in totals this 
amounts to 16,836 over 2008-12. 
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Table 1 Net Job Change Forecasts: Scenario comparison, 2008-2012 
 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-10 2007-12 
        
Optimistic -4,230 -32,470 -4,992 23,669 29,876 -41,692 11,853 
Central -4,230 -37,244 -11,638 14,222 23,605 -53,112 -15,285 
Recession -4,230 -46,498 -15,662 9.081 17,318 -66,389 -39,991 
Sustained recession -4,230 -72,639 -43,776 2,236 8,371 -120,644 -110,038 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Unemployment Forecasts: Scenario comparison, 2008-2012 
 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ILO      
Optimistic 4.4% 5.6% 5.9% 5.4% 5.0% 
Central 4.4% 5.7% 6.1% 5.7% 5.2% 
Recession 4.4% 6.1% 6.2% 5.8% 5.3% 
Sustained recession  4.4% 6.5% 7.1% 6.2% 5.8% 
      
CC      
Optimistic 2.8% 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 
Central 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 
Recession 2.8% 3.6% 3.7% 3.3% 3.2% 
Sustained recession  2.8% 4.0% 4.3% 3.6% 3.4% 
 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
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Unemployment forecasts 
It has been some time since unemployment was relatively high 
in Scotland and even when electronics collapsed in 2001-02, 
the service sector took on a lot of workers and the rise in 
unemployment was relatively muted. There are clear signs of 
rising unemployment in the economy and of fewer vacancies 
while business surveys indicate employers’ intentions on 
recruitment are currently negative. The forecasts of 
unemployment for ILO unemployment and the claimant count 
measure are presented below.  
 
Unemployment on the claimant count measure is relatively 
benign in the Optimistic scenario although ILO unemployment 
peaks in 2010 at 5.9 per cent. 2010 tends to be the year that 
ILO unemployment peaks in for all of the other three scenarios 
as well. Unemployment at 7.1 per cent is particularly high in the 
Recession plus scenario. The significant difference between 6.2 
per cent (Recession) and the 7.1 per cent (Sustained recession) 
is something that policymakers need to heed. 
 
Claimant count unemployment is relatively muted in the 
Optimistic scenario and likewise does not pose too much of a 
problem in the Central scenario. In the Recession scenario and 
in the Sustained recession case it is more noticeable and may 
be a particular problem in the Sustained recession scenario if 
this actually came about. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The forecasts assumed four different outcomes for 9 factors 
which combined to give the forecasts as described above. The 
Optimistic scenario is where most factors are dealt with in an 
optimal way leading to the least disruption to the economy. The 
Central scenario (40 per cent probability and the outcome most 
likely to happen) indicates that 2009 is a problem year for 
output and that 2010 is the year in which unemployment peaks. 
Net job change is negative in 2008 and 2009 but recovers 
thereafter. The Recession scenario is one where economic 
conditions are worse than expected and some particular 
problems occur but overall there is a general worsening of 
conditions making it more difficult across the economy. Small 
and medium-sized businesses are expected to find this 
scenario tough with hiring, lending, cash-flow, job losses and 
exporting being problematic areas. In the last scenario, the 
sustained recession scenario, the main problem is that 
recapitalisation did not work as effectively as hoped while 
lending behaviour is poor and even large firms struggle. 
Inflationary pressures also return in this scenario giving it more 
problems. The outcome is that there is a sharp contraction in 
activity in 2009 and a very slow recovery that does not follow 
the paths of the other three scenarios. While it only has a 10 per 
cent probability it still remains a distinct possibility. All the risks 
in this scenario are on the downside. Policymakers need to 
guard against complacency and to watch that none of these 
factors come into play.  
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Appendix 1 
The assumptions for the four scenarios considered are 
presented here in the appendix. 
 
Central scenario: 
 Interest rates are cut in a cautious but responsive 
approach to around 3 per cent by 2009. The 
November cut is deeper than the others although a 
similar cut may be implemented in January or 
February. By mid 2009 the Bank of England will have 
reduced interest rate to about 3-3.25 per cent; 
 Inflationary expectations are relatively muted as oil 
settles to approximately $90 per barrel; 
 The banks take up the government re-capitalisation 
scheme as well as taking advantage of the Bank of 
England schemes. The period of re-capitalisation is 
expected to last for about 18-24 months. Private 
capital is also raised; 
 Lending behaviour initially does not change 
significantly in the short run and despite interest rate 
cuts, interbank lending rates (Libor) do not converge 
on the base rate (set by the Bank of England) as 
quickly as the Government and the Bank of England 
would like. Lending eases somewhat however after 
about 12 months and definitely much more within 18 
months; 
 The impact of the financial sector crisis is felt across 
the real economy as investment rapidly shrinks and 
lending constraints hit small and medium-sized 
businesses particularly hard. Cash-flow for these firms 
becomes a critical issue in the struggle for survival. 
Only after prolonged lobbying and negotiation with 
government do financial institutions respond to the 
need for an improvement in helping companies with 
rescheduling debt, future funding and finance 
packages. Within the finance sector itself about 10,000 
jobs are lost; 
 Many firms experience financial hardship and lay off 
workers from the end of 2008 and throughout 2009. 
Unemployment rises considerably in 2009. Household 
disposable income tightens sharply and labour market 
opportunities become fewer; 
 In the housing market prices continue to fall through 
2009 and into 2010. House prices remain flat for about 
3-5 years before growth is seen again; 
 Government debt and imbalances widen as debt rises 
sharply in 2009. The planned economic recovery 
works relatively well however and government debt is 
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favourable when compared to some other developed 
nations (as a percentage of GDP) and 
 Exports fall as domestic demand in the US and Euro 
Area contract quickly and substantially. Imports to the 
UK fall by a greater amount therefore there is a net 
gain. Although sterling depreciates the stimulus this 
gives to boosting exports is completely offset by the 
reduction in demand elsewhere. 
 
Optimistic scenario: 
 Interest rates are cut more sharply to 3 per cent by 
early to mid 2009 using an initial cut of 1 per cent in 
November. Subsequent cuts are smaller but may be of 
a further 50 basis points in 
December/January/February. By the middle, and 
certainly by the end of 2009, the Bank of England will 
have reduced the base rate to 2.5-3 per cent; 
 Inflationary expectations remain low as oil prices are 
close to $80 per barrel throughout 2009. There is no 
evidence of previous higher prices feeding into wage 
claims; 
 The banks eagerly take up the government re-
capitalisation scheme as well as the Bank of England 
initiatives. The period of re-capitalisation is boosted by 
external private capital as well as a greater response 
by institutional investors. Banks with expected future 
prospects that are better than others benefit more and 
can redeem some preferences shares and re-
negotiate dividends conditions. Share prices begin to 
rise more steadily by the end of 2009 as new 
management teams tackle the problems in the sector 
in an effective and efficient manner. A better 
performance is seen within 12 months although full 
recapitalisation still takes 12-18 months; 
 Lending behaviour the very short-term remains 
constrained but by early 2009 business terms are 
beginning to ease, thus helping firms with significant 
cash-flow and funding issues. Interbank lending rates 
do not converge on the base rate as quickly as 
perhaps desired but there is a clear downward 
movement towards it. Lending eases significantly after 
about 12 months; 
 The short-run impact of the financial sector remains 
sharp across the real economy and investment 
contracts quickly. Small and medium sized businesses 
do not experience any benefit until at least mid 2009. 
Cash-flow remains a key issue. The finance sector, 
independently and relatively quickly develop strategies 
to help businesses reschedule debt etc. Within the 
finance sector itself about 5-7,000 jobs are lost; 
 Companies still experience financial hardship and lay 
off workers from the end of 2008 and throughout 2009. 
Unemployment rises significantly in 2009. Household 
disposable income tightens sharply and labour market 
opportunities become fewer, but there is an easing in 
the labour market towards the end of 2009 as the rate 
of job loss slows thus easing the pressure on 
unemployment; 
 House prices fall through 2009 and into 2010. House 
prices remain flat for approximately 3 years rising 
again, although at a modest pace initially; 
 Government debt and imbalances widen as debt rises 
sharply in 2009. Depending on whether or not the 
banking and the financial sector needs more debt 
which may be taken on by the government or the Bank 
of England as they help institutions through the crisis. 
It is not envisaged that this would be anything like the 
recent recovery plan just modest additional resources 
to smooth the current functioning of the current plan. 
The planned economic recovery works better than 
expected and government debt is still favourable when 
compared to some other developed nations (as a 
percentage of GDP). Financial institutions are in a 
much healthier and stronger position by the end of 
2009 and certainly by mid 2010 and 
 As in the previous scenario exports fall as domestic 
demand in the US and Euro Area contract quickly and 
substantially. Imports to the UK also fall by a greater 
amount giving a net gain. The sterling depreciation 
stimulates exports slightly more than expected but this 
is still completely offset by the reduction in demand. 
 
Recession scenario: 
 Interest rates are cut in a cautious approach to around 
3.5 per cent by 2009. There is not a deep policy 
induced cut in November or February (although a cut 
of 50 basis points may take place in November). By 
mid 2009 the Bank of England will have reduced 
interest rate to about 3.5 per cent with the possibility of 
a further cut to 3.25 per cent; 
 There is significant concern over inflationary pressures 
as OPEC push the price of oil towards $100 per barrel. 
Demand for oil remains high in China, India and the 
emerging economies while geopolitical factors hinder 
supply slightly; 
 The banks and the government re-capitalisation 
scheme goes ahead with minor difficulties arising 
around the conditions of the offer. The Bank of 
England scheme is taken up without any problems. 
Private capital is slightly discouraged by future 
economic prospects and recapitalisation takes longer 
than expected, perhaps as long as 18 months or 
slightly more. Private equity returns to the banks after 
this period and share prices begin to rise significantly 
again; 
 Lending behaviour does not change significantly and 
businesses are not given the chance to re-schedule 
debt or to obtain additional funding from the UK 
finance sector in either the first quarter or first half of 
2009. The gap between the Bank of England base rate 
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and the Libor rate for bank inter-lending does not 
improve significantly with rates at around 1 percentage 
point above the base rate. Lending only improves after 
about 12-18 months; 
 The impact of the financial sector crisis across the real 
economy is slightly more painful with sharp 
contractions in investment, consumption, lending and 
hiring which initially affects mostly small and medium-
sized businesses, however now large firms are feeling 
a significant impact from this. Cash-flow becomes 
tighter and more firms fail. It takes longer for the 
financial sector to respond to the needs of business. 
Within the finance sector itself about 15,000 jobs are 
lost; 
 Most firms experience financial hardship and lay off a 
considerable number of workers in 2009. 
Unemployment increases by more than expected in 
2009. Household incomes drop and  the labour market 
weakens considerably making conditions tougher 
throughout 2009 and into the early part of 2010; 
 House prices fall more than expected in 2009 and 
weaken again in 2010. After this house prices remain 
flat for about 5 years before growth is seen again; 
 Government debt and imbalances widen as debt 
increases but it only increases relatively slowly 
following the initial recovery plan. The planned 
economic recovery is slower than expected as 
confidence falls further. Government debt remains 
favourable when compared to some other developed 
nations (as a percentage of GDP) and 
 Exports continue to fall as domestic demand in the US 
and Euro Area contract quickly and substantially. 
Imports to the UK fall by a greater amount therefore 
there is a net gain. Although sterling depreciates the 
stimulus this gives to boosting exports is completely 
offset by the reduction in demand elsewhere. It takes 
longer for exporting firms to recover from the crisis and 
a significant number go out of business. 
 
A Sustained recession scenario: 
 Interest rates are cut in a responsive approach to 
around 3-3.5 per cent by 2009. A cautious and 
stepwise approach is taken. The Bank of England fails 
to get in front of the curve; 
 Inflationary expectations are a significant concern as 
demand for oil outstrips supply. The price of oil 
increases to above $100 per barrel in 2009 due to a 
combination of OPEC action and supply/demand 
fundamentals; 
 The banks take up the government re-capitalisation 
scheme as well as taking advantage of the Bank of 
England schemes. A major problem remains exposure 
to toxic US assets and loans as well as how the sector 
deals with these. There is little response from private 
investors and further losses come to light. There is 
significant disquiet about dividends and institutional 
investors remain unhappy with performance. Relations 
between government and the finance sector worsen. 
Some institutions need further help from government. 
The period of re-capitalisation is expected to last for 
about 24-36 months; 
 Lending behaviour does not change significantly 
causing problems in the real economy. Although the 
base rate is cut, interbank lending remains difficult 
causing financial institutions more difficulties. Lending 
only eases after about 18-24 months; 
 The impact of the financial sector crisis is sharply felt 
across the real economy for a prolonged period of 
time. Confidence is badly shaken and consumption, 
investment, lending, hiring, training and exports are hit 
hard. Although small and medium-sized businesses 
suffer significant cash-flow problems with rising 
insolvencies, the main concern is over large firms and 
falling payrolls. Further government intervention is 
required to help financial institutions to cope with the 
increasing demands of companies. The finance sector 
may shed up to 20-30,000 jobs as there is a significant 
contraction in the sector. External takeovers cannot be 
ruled out; 
 Firms shedding labour becomes a major problem from 
2009 onwards. Unemployment rises considerably in 
2009 and continues increasing into 2010. Households 
suffer a contraction in wealth as incomes fall and asset 
prices suffer; 
 The housing market suffers a prolonged contraction 
through to the end of 2010 and perhaps into early 
2011. House prices remain flat for about 5-8 years 
before growth is seen again; 
 Government debt and imbalances grow in 2009 and in 
2010. The planned economic recovery is not as 
effective as thought and takes significantly longer. 
Government debt is favourable when compared to 
some other developed nations (as a percentage of 
GDP) but is forecast to climb perhaps by a further 5 
percentage points from its current forecast in the 
period 2010 to 2015 and 
 Exports fall as domestic demand in the US and Euro 
Area contract. Imports to the UK fall by a greater 
amount therefore there is a small net gain. Sterling 
depreciates in 2008 but then falls further again as the 
economic crisis worsens. This gives the basis for an 
export led recovery as the Euro Area recovers slightly. 
 
